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Less Than I Expected and oh so True? On the Interplay 
Between Expectations and Framing Effects in Judgments 
of Truth 
 




This manuscript investigates the negativity bias in truth judgments, which holds that negatively 
(versus positively) framed statements are more likely to be judged true. Throughout four studies 
we find that expectations moderate the negativity bias. In particular, Study 1 failed to replicate 
the negativity bias with standard items. In Study 2 we investigated individuals’ expectations 
regarding the statements. When systematically adjusting the percentages in negatively framed 
statements to be lower than expected, a negativity bias occurred in Study 3. Building on this 
knowledge in Study 4, we systematically decreased and increased percentages in both framing 
conditions, investigating the impact of under- versus overestimation. While expectations had 
no consistent effects for positive frames, overestimation (versus underestimation) led to a 
higher likelihood of perceived truth in the negative framing condition. Results are discussed in 
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On April 17, 2018, Donald Trump, then president of the United States of America, tweeted the 
following: “Rasmussen just came out at 51% Approval despite the Fake News Media […]” 
(RealDonaldTrump, 2018). This tweet referred to the Rasmussen reports that assessed the 
approval rate in regards to the president’s performance. How did individuals evaluate this piece 
of information? Did they perceive this piece of information as true? And would they have 
perceived it differently if the same notion was framed negatively, focusing on a 49% 
disapproval rate? Recent findings suggest that the frame of a statement, meaning whether it 
focuses on something conceptually positive versus negative, plays an important role in the 
evaluation of statistical statements. In particular, Hilbig (2009, 2012a, b) showed that content-
wise identical statements are more likely to be deemed true when framed negatively (e.g., 
focusing on the disapproval rate) compared to positively (e.g., focusing on the approval rate), 
which has been coined the negativity bias in judgments of truth. According to these findings, 
framing Donald Trump’s tweet in terms of disapproval (compared to approval) should lead to 
a higher probability of being judged true. Here we extend previous findings and argue that the 
negative frame is more credible in some conditions than in others. More specifically, we 
empirically demonstrate that individuals’ expectations regarding the to-be-evaluated issues 
(e.g., what are individuals’ expectations in regards to the (dis)approval rates) play a crucial role 
in whether a negatively or a positively framed statement is more likely to be judged true. 
Especially when negatively framed messages are less negative than expected, judgments are 
more likely to lean in the direction of “true” compared to “false,” for a good reason, as we argue 
later. 
Truthfulness is one of the cornerstones of our society. Research suggests that individuals 
generally show a willingness to believe new information to be true (truth bias, e.g., Burgoon, 
Blair, & Strom, 2008), especially when the information is presented by one’s in-group 
(Clementson, 2018). However, the debate about fake news casts doubt on whether a general 
truth bias is adaptive, as apparently politicians, managers, and the press do not necessarily speak 
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the (entire) truth. In light of this trend, the Oxford Dictionary chose post-truth as word of the 
year 2016, an adjective described as “relating or denoting circumstances in which objective  
facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal beliefs” 
(Oxford Dictionary, 2016). Although the concept of post-truth has existed for the past decade, 
Oxford Dictionary argued that the frequency of usage spiked in the context of the EU 
referendum in the United Kingdom and the 2016 presidential election in the United States and 
has therefore been associated with the particular noun of post-truth politics. The notion of post-
truth reflects the general assumption that we are entering a time “in which the specified concept 
[of truth] has become unimportant or irrelevant,” especially in the context of politics. In such a 
world of uncertainty, alternative facts, and post-truth politics, not simply believing statements 
to be true but distinguishing between what is true or false becomes more and more important – 
and for scientists understanding the mechanisms of when individuals are more or less likely to 
evaluate something as true is of special interest.  
 
How do Individuals Judge Truth? 
Previous research has identified different mechanisms that influence whether individuals judge 
a statement as true or false. Particularly influential aspects are: To what extent statements are 
coherent with individuals’ beliefs (Dunwoody, 2009); whether or not individuals succeed in 
finding matching information in their memory (Reder, 1982); to what extent the information is 
consistent and plausible (Reder, 1982); and how easily (fluently) individuals can process the 
information (Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wanke, 2010; Reber & Schwarz, 1999). Furthermore, 
the valence framing of the statement has been identified as influential, indicating that 
individuals are more likely to evaluate a content-wise identical statement as true when framed 
negatively compared to positively (Hilbig, 2009, 2012a, b), as further detailed next.  
 
The Negativity Bias in Judgments of Truth 
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Hilbig (2009) first reported that formally equivalent messages are more likely to be deemed 
true when framed negatively compared to positively. In a typical experiment (Hilbig, 2012a), 
participants are provided with a number of statements, which are framed either negatively (“In 
the Dominican Republic, 30% of the population are not reached by vaccination measures”) or 
positively (“In the Dominican Republic, 70% of the population are reached by vaccination 
measures”). Importantly, the valence of the frame refers only to the topics or attributes that the 
sentence is focusing on (such as approval/disapproval rate in the introductory example) and 
therefore conceptualized as concept frame. Within this conceptualization, the question is 
whether the sentences’ overall framing refers (normatively) to something good (approval rate 
or being reached by vaccination measures) or something bad (disapproval rate or not being 
reached by vaccination measures). 
This conceptualization, however, does not take into account the valence of the concept 
in question (the sentence’s target concept, e.g., satisfaction as concept with positive valence 
versus dissatisfaction as concept with negative valence) nor the negation (the semantic 
operation of negating a concept). Yet, concept valence and negation often work in tandem to 
produce concept framing. That is, “not satisfied” (negated positive concept valence) or 
“dissatisfied” (negative concept valence) both result in a negative frame; “not dissatisfied” 
(negated negative concept valence) or “satisfied” (positive concept valence) both result in a 
positive frame. This conceptualization also does not consider the subjectively construed 
consequentiality: Even a negative frame may be something positive, if it is less prevalent than 
expected. From the perspective of the original literature, however, a sentence focusing on 
divorce will be considered as negatively framed, and a sentence focusing on long lasting 
marriages as positively framed, irrespective of whether the likelihood for the event to happen 
is high or low (which would impact the fact’s consequentiality). 
In Hilbig’s (Hilbig, 2009, 2012a, b) experiments, participants read one version of the 
statement and were then asked to judge the truth of the stated information. Results indicate that 
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negatively framed statements are more likely to be evaluated as true than the content-wise 
identical, but positively framed statement (Hilbig, 2009, 2012b). This bias was found to be 
robust, with medium to large effect sizes (ds = .60 - .82; Hilbig, 2009).  
But why is negatively framed information compared to positively framed information 
deemed more true? Negative information compared to positive information has a greater impact 
on human cognition, affect, and behavior in general (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & 
Vohs, 2001), which was coined the “Bad is stronger than good effect”. The authors argue, for 
example, that negative life events are far more influential than positive life events, as one 
negative major life event can have detrimental psychological effects (leading, e.g., to 
posttraumatic stress disorders), whereas multiple positive events cannot provide a sufficient 
buffer for individuals.  This research is also consistent with more general evidence suggesting 
that losses compared to gains loom larger; meaning that framing an outcome in terms of gains 
or losses critically impacts individuals decisions and risk taking behavior (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).   
Moreover, negative instances attract more attention (Pratto & John, 1991) and are 
perceived as more informative (Peeters & Czapinski, 1990), perhaps because negative instances 
are more rare and more threatening (Dijksterhuis & Aarts, 2003; Lewicka, Czapinski, & 
Peeters, 1992; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990). Interestingly, that negativity attracts more attention 
is also apparent in recent research on emotive intensifiers (e.g., such as “terribly” nice), 
suggesting that emotive intensifiers often relate to negative emotions (e.g., fright and horror; 
Jing-Schmidt, 2007) and therefore might result in closer attention to the information shared. 
Another potential explanation for the “bad is stronger than good phenomenon” 
(Baumeister et al., 2001) stems from the observation that positive information is more similar 
than negative information (Alves, Koch, & Unkelbach, 2017; Koch, Alves, Krueger, & 
Unkelbach, 2016). Presumably this is because positive states are comparably non-extreme, 
whereas negative information is more distinct (Alves et al., 2017). To illustrate, for many 
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attribute dimensions, the extremes are negative, and the middle range is positive – individuals 
typically rate an average face (e.g., a morph of different faces) as more attractive than faces 
with extreme features (Langlois & Roggman, 1990). Against this background, individuals 
benefit more from paying special attention to negative information and from weighing it more 
strongly in their decision-making processes. As a result, negative (bad) information may be 
weighted more heavily than positive (good) information (Baumeister et al., 2001).  
Using a multinomial processing tree model, Hilbig (2012b) argues that the negativity 
bias in judgments of truth is a response bias and not due to differences in knowledge. More 
specifically, he argues that the observed evidence is compatible with the idea that the 
accumulation of confirming evidence may proceed more quickly for the negative (bad) 
compared to the positive (good) information frame and that these differences in processing 
fluency may drive framing effects (p. 46, and see Hilbig, 2012a). 
More recently, Koch and Peter (2017) investigated the context in framing and truth 
judgments. More specifically, their research focuses on the negativity bias in the context of 
political messages as well as the trustworthiness of politicians. The authors showed that positive 
framing can be associated with persuasive communication, and therefore reduce the perceived 
truth of the message as well as the trustworthiness of the source (Koch & Peter, 2017). All in 
all, different lines of research converge in suggesting that negative statements are more likely 
to attract attention, are more likely to be elaborated, and finally, are more likely believed as 
true.  
In this context, we aimed at investigating the negativity bias in judgments of truth in an 
arena important for many individuals: health and well-being. In particular, we focused on health 
and well-being topics that were important to women in German speaking countries. To our 
surprise, the results of Study 1 were not consistent with earlier evidence on the negativity bias. 
We therefore proceeded by analyzing individuals’ expectation regarding the specific contents 
(see Study 2) and found systematic patterns. Systematically adjusting the percentage rate in the 
Negativity Bias and Judgments of Truth: Jaffé and Greifeneder 
 
 7 
negative frame (Study 3) and in both frames (Study 4) then allowed investigating when a 
negativity bias in judgments of truth is likely to occur. 
 
Study 1 
Study 1 serves as a starting point for the current research line. The basic aim of Study 1 was to 
create a new set of items related to topics such as health and well-being that can be used to 
investigate the negativity bias. We hypothesized:  
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Negatively compared to positively framed statements are 
more likely judged as true. 
 
Given the bias’s robustness in previous research across different statements, using new 
and previously untested statements did not occur to us as problematic. We constructed eight 
items that followed the structural logic introduced by Hilbig (2009). The items were related to 
German-speaking women, covering topics such as their status regarding health, well-being, and 
social security. An exemplary item is “70% of German-speaking women do not text while 
driving a car” (positive frame) or “30% of German-speaking women text while driving a car” 
(negative frame). All of the eight items were factually true. 
Study 1 consists of two data sets that were collected within the frame of two months. 
The first set of data consists of 161 participants (Study 1a), the second set of data of 21 
participants (Study 1b). As the two studies were highly similar in methodology, we combined 
the two datasets for analysis. Tables 2 and 4 (Appendix A) provide an overview of the findings 
separately for each dataset.  
 
Method 
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Participants and Design. One hundred eighty-two students in a German-speaking country 
participated (61 male, 117 female, 4 no answer; Mage = 23.71, SDage = 5.62) and judged the 
veracity of either eight positively or negatively framed items (between subjects factor: valence). 
Judgments of truth served as a dependent variable and were coded as 0 for false and 1 for true, 
and were averaged across the statements. In the Study 1b, we additionally and exploratorily 
asked participants to judge how threatening they perceived each statement’s content to be on a 
seven-point Likert scale (1 = not threatening at all, 7 = very threatening). Participants received 
a snack and/or a small amount of monetary compensation (about 1 US$). 
 
Materials and Procedure. The eight items used in this study are presented in Table 1. The 
survey was conducted using tablet computers in the main university building. Research 
assistants approached passing students and asked them to participate in the study. Participants 
were asked to first read an exemplary statement, and to judge whether they believed this 
statement to be true or false (not analyzed). Participants were further told that not knowing the 
correct answer is perfectly normal, and were asked to make an educated guess, without using 
additional sources such as Google or Wikipedia. Participants then evaluated the truthfulness of 
eight positively or negatively framed items, and completed some demographic questions.  
 
Results 
When looking at descriptive results, across both datasets, we find that participants were more 
likely to judge the positive frame (compared to the negative frame) as true. Table 1 summarizes 
these results. Contrary to previous results in the literature, the positively framed items were 
more likely to be judged as true compared to the negatively framed items, M = .56, SD = .20; 
M = .50, SD = .16; respectively, t(172.14) = 2.30, p = .023, d = 0.33. The results therefore do 
not provide support for the occurrence of a negativity bias, but instead hint towards a positivity 
bias tendency.  
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< Insert Table 1 here > 
 
Discussion 
Study 1 failed to replicate the negativity bias in judgments of truth (Hilbig, 2009, 2012b) and 
did not provide support for H1. Instead we found a positivity bias. We took this unexpected 
finding as grounds to further explore the circumstances in which a negativity bias occurs, and 
started our search by comparing our study with existing ones. One possibility could be 
systematic item specificities that differentiate our items from the ones previously used. Yet no 
such systematic specificities were apparent to us. However, we realized that for those few items 
that showed a negativity bias in our sample, we were ourselves (positively) surprised about the 
stated truth. That is, some of the negative statements were less negative than we had expected—
apparently, the world was in a better state than we had thought. To illustrate, learning that only 
7% of women in German-speaking areas evaluate their health as bad or very bad appeared to 
us to as rather good news. Interestingly, when looking back at the items employed by Hilbig 
(2009), at least for some of them, the negatively framed truth surprised us in a positive sense, 
too. For instance, that only 20% of marriages result in divorce within the first 10 years in 
Germany surprised us in a positive sense, given that the average divorce rate in the authors’ 
country of residence is slightly higher than 40% (see Federal Statistical Office, 
www.bfs.admin.ch). Consistent with findings in regards to the optimism bias (Sharot, Korn, & 
Dolan, 2011; Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, & Phelps, 2007), which holds that individuals are more 
likely to update their beliefs when learning that certain risks are lower (compared to higher) 
than expected, it is conceivable that individuals are biased to perceive good news as true, and 
therefore evaluate particularly those negatively framed statements as true that are more positive 
than expected. 
 Consistent with previous research showing that individuals’ expectations impact 
judgments of truth more generally (e.g., Levine et al., 2000) and that expectations even 
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influence how language is perceived (Niedzielski, 1999), we hypothesize that individuals’ 
expectations play a crucial role in the negativity bias, since expectations might critically 
influence whether a negative thing is negative, or in fact perceived as positive in regards to the 
subjectively construed consequentiality.   
 
Study 2 
To gain insight into individuals’ expectations regarding the statements’ content used in Study 
1, we asked individuals to estimate the percentage of German-speaking women for whom a 
certain statement would be true.  
 
Method 
We used the same eight items as in the previous studies, and asked participants to estimate the 
percentage rates either for eight positively or negatively framed items (between subjects factor). 
Study 2 was conducted with tablet computers in the main university building. Research 
assistants approached passing students and asked them to participate in the short study for a 
chocolate bar. Eighty-one students participated (40 male, 41 female; Mage = 25.44, SDage = 6.06) 
and completed the study.  
 
Results 
Individuals’ percentage expectations are summarized in Table 2. In general, individuals’ 
expectations differed from the factually true percentage rates. More particularly, estimates 
differed from the actual percentages by about 12 %-points for negatively framed items, and by 
about 14 %-points for positively framed items (absolute values).  
 
< Insert Table 2 here > 
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Next, we investigated whether descriptively systematic patterns occurred on the item 
level. To this end we combined the results from Studies 1a and 2. Revisiting the data from 
Study 1a, a positivity bias occurred for the statements 1, 2, 3, and 4 (marked with an a in Table 
2). For statements 5, 6, and 8 (marked by a b), a negativity bias was descriptively present. 
Coupled with the expectation ratings assessed in Study 2, an interesting pattern emerges. For 
items that showed a negativity bias, participants overestimated the percentage rates for the 
negatively framed items and underestimated the percentage rates for positively framed items. 
For items that showed a positivity bias, no consistent pattern emerges—some percentages were 




In Study 2 we collected further data regarding the statements used in the previous study. 
Participants’ mean expectations differed markedly from the true values. More importantly, 
however, a systematic pattern emerged as a function of over-/underestimation and truth 
judgments when comparing data across Studies 1a and 2. A negativity bias was more likely to 
be apparent in participants’ truth judgments when the occurrence of the aspect was 
overestimated in the negatively framed version, and underestimated in the positively framed 
version. This pattern provides initial support for H2.  
 
Study 3 
The combination of the previous studies suggests that a negativity bias may be likely in cases 
where individuals overestimate the occurrence of a negatively framed fact, and underestimate 
the occurrence of a positively framed fact. This conclusion was reached in a data-driven fashion 
and resulted in Hypothesis 2.  




Hypothesis 2 (H2): A negativity bias in judgments of truth is more likely to be 
present when the occurrence of the aspect is overestimated in the negatively framed 
version, and underestimated in the positively framed version. 
 
 To test H2 more rigorously, we now aimed to investigate in Study 3 whether we could 
produce a negativity bias in our set of eight statements regarding German-speaking women 
given the previous insights. Because the negativity bias highlights the role of the negative, we 
here focus on the negative frame. Given that participants judged statements as more likely to 
be true when they overestimated the frequency of occurrence in the negatively framed version, 
we adjusted the percentage rates for our statements in a systematic way as a function of 
statement valence. In particular, we changed the percentages so that for negatively framed items 
the new percentage rates were lower than expected (triggering overestimation), by subtracting 
an average of 13.5 points (the mean deviation between individuals’ expectations and the actual 
percentages for the negatively framed statements 5 and 6, where a negativity bias occurred and 
strong deviations were apparent), from the previous item value. For positively framed items, 
we adjusted the percentages so that percentages across negative/positive framing add up to 100 
(following Hilbig, 2009). If by this logic a percentage rate would have ended up being 0 or 100, 
we adjusted the percentage to 1 or 99 accordingly. Item 1 now read “10% (= expected value: 
23.17% - constant: 13.5) of all German-speaking women die from cardiovascular diseases” in 
the negative frame and “90% (= 100 – adjusted percentage rate in negative frame: 10%) of all 
German-speaking women do not die from cardiovascular diseases” in the positive frame. 
 
Method 
Participants. Using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), we conducted a power 
analysis with an estimated medium effect size (d = .5), an alpha level of .05, and an aspired 
Negativity Bias and Judgments of Truth: Jaffé and Greifeneder 
 
 13 
power of 0.8. The analysis indicated a required sample size of 102 participants. The study was 
conducted in our research lab as part of a study package and was advertised in psychology 
lectures as well as on local online platforms. The study package took about 11 minutes to 
complete. One hundred fourteen individuals completed the questionnaire (24 males, 89 females, 
1 no answer; Mage = 21.99 years, SDage = 6.06). Participants received course credit as 
compensation. 
 
Design. Participants read eight statements that differed in regards to valence (negative versus 
positive frame, between-subjects design). The dependent variable was the average perceived 
veracity over the eight items. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. 
 
Materials and Procedure. The Setup of Study 3 is equivalent to Studies 1a and 1b, except for 
the implementation of adjusted percentage values.  
 
Results 
Overall, participants judged 3.93 statements as true (about 49%; SD = 1.49), and individuals 
ranged from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 7 statements judged as true. Looking at the 
statement-level, the average ratings of truthfulness varied from .38 to .58 for the individual 
items. As no statements seemed to be judged as true or false by all participants, we summarized 
the judgments and calculated a mean perceived veracity score over all eight statements.  
To analyze if a negativity bias occurred, we calculated a t-test with valence as an 
independent variable and mean perceived veracity as a dependent variable. Our results yield a 
significant difference in mean perceived veracity depending on valence framing, 
t(111.90) = -3.27, p = .001, d = .61. Looking at mean perceived veracity scores, participants 
rated negatively framed statements as true on average in 55% of the cases (SD = 18), compared 
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to 43% of the cases for positively framed statements (SD = .18). Obviously, a negativity bias 
occurred – the negatively framed statements were more likely to be judged as true.  
 
Discussion 
Study 3 highlights the importance of individuals’ expectations for the occurrence of a negativity 
bias. Compared to the previous studies, we adjusted the percentage rates so that the percentages 
of the negatively framed versions were lower than expected by a separate sample (assessed in 
Study 2). This simple change yielded a significant negativity bias where we had observed none 
or even a positivity bias in Studies 1a and 1b, and therefore provides support for H2.  
In this study, we adjusted the percentages so that in the negatively framed version, the 
percentages were lower than expected. In the positively framed version, we calculated 
percentages as a function of the negative frames, so that positive and negative frames together 
add up to 100%. This procedure, however, does not allow for the systematic investigation of 
effects of over and underestimation for both negative and positively framed statements. We 
address this question in Study 4.  
 
Study 4 
In Study 4 we again focused on the effects of individuals’ expectations on subsequent 
judgments of truth, but additionally focused on the impact of over- and underestimation within 
positive frames. Results from Study 3 point to the conclusion that percentages lower than 
expected in the negative frame may result in a negativity bias. Because we constructed the 
positive frames in Study 3 to be, content-wise, identical (percentage rates were mirrored to the 
adjusted rated in the negative frames), we were not able to systematically test the impact of 
expectations in the positive valence framing condition. Although previous research based on 
the propositions of the Expectancy Violation Theory (Burgoon & Jones, 1976) has not found 
evidence for valence asymmetries in the violation of expectations in impression formation (e.g., 
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Brannon & Gawronski, 2018), it appeared commendable to systematically test both over- and 
underestimation, for both negative and positive frames in judgments of truth. As this objective 
comes with the methodological caveat that statements are not content-wise identical anymore 
across negative/positive framing, we compare effects of over- and underestimation within 
positive and negative frames.  
 
Method 
Participants. We conducted an a priori power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) with 
an estimate of a medium effect size (f = .25), an alpha-level of .05, and an aspired power of .95, 
which resulted in a required sample size of 210 participants. Compared to Study 3 we aimed 
for a higher power, to account for an equal importance of both the alpha and the beta-error. We 
collected data from 234 participants (132 male, 102 female, Mage = 38.63, SDage = 12.40) via 
the platform clickworker.de. Participants worked on the study for about 3 minutes and received 
0.45 € (about 0.5 $) as compensation. 
 
Design. Participants judged the truthfulness of eight statements, which varied in regards to 
valence (a positive versus negative frame; between subjects factor) and direction of deviance 
(over- versus underestimation; between subjects factor). This results in a 2 (valence) * 2 
(deviance in estimation) design, with average perceived veracity as the dependent variable. 
 
Materials. We used the same eight statements as before, with a negative or positive frame. 
However, we adjusted the percentages so that in both valence conditions, the rates would be 
lower or higher than the previously assessed expectations (Study 2). Specifically, we subtracted 
or added one standard deviation to achieve percentages that were below or above the expected 
values (standard deviations were taken from Study 2). We did this adjustment separately for 
the negative and the positive frame to be able to test the impact of over- and underestimation 
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for both framing conditions. This procedure comes with the downside that positive versus 
negative frames are no longer content-wise equal, as the separately calculated percentage rates 
across the negative and the positive valence no longer add up to 100. Table 3 summarizes the 
set of new items. 
 
Procedure. Study 4 follows the same procedure as Study 3, except for the adjusted percentages 
in the statements. 
 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
 
Results 
Overall, participants judged 4.21 statements as true (about 53%; SD = 1.67), and individuals 
ranged from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 8 statements judged as true. At the level of 
individual statements, the average ratings of truthfulness varied from .45 to .64. As no statement 
was judged as true or false by all participants, we summarized the judgments and calculated a 
mean perceived veracity score over all eight statements.  
To investigate the interplay between valence and deviance in estimation, we calculated 
a 2 * 2 ANOVA with mean perceived veracity as the dependent variable. Interestingly, we find 
a main effect for deviance in estimation, F(1, 230) = 5.16, p = .024, ηp2 = .02, indicating that 
statements were more likely to be believed as true in cases of overestimation compared to 
underestimation (M = .56, SD = .20; M = .50, SD = .22; respectively). This main effect was 
further qualified by an interaction between deviance in estimation and valence framing, 
F(1, 230) = 6.05, p = .015, ηp2 = .03. Simple main effects indicate that for the negatively framed 
statements, overestimation compared to underestimation led to a higher likelihood of truth 
ratings, Moverestimation = .57, SD = .21; Munderestimation = .45, SD = .20; F(1, 230) = 11.20, p = .001, 
ηp2 = .05. For positively framed statements no differences in truth ratings were apparent, 
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Moverestimation = .54, SD = .18; Munderestimation = .55, SD = .23; F(1, 230) = 0.02, p = .895, ηp2 = .00. 
The main effect for valence was not significant, F < 1.5. 
 
Discussion 
The results from Study 4 show that the deviance of the percentages in relation to expectations 
assessed in a separate sample (Study 2) play a crucial role when judging a statement’s veracity. 
In Study 4, we find that overestimation generally appeared to increase the likelihood of truth 
ratings, yet this main effect is qualified by an interaction. Study 4, therefore, supports the 
hypothesis developed from Studies 2 and 3; for negatively framed items, percentages that are 
lower than expected result in higher levels of truth judgments. This difference did not occur for 
positively framed statements. As briefly discussed before, we used statements about rather 
important topics such as issues regarding health and well-being. We therefore speculate that in 
the negative frames, overestimation might simply feel better, as the world appears better than 
expected. Learning that 31% of women are dissatisfied with their looks while expecting the 
percentage rate to be much higher (54%) is likely good news. In contrast, with positive frames, 
overestimation does not feel better. Learning that 24% of women are satisfied with their looks, 
while expecting this number to be around 45%, is bad news and likely unsatisfactory. 
Interestingly, these findings support the conclusion made by Brannon and Gawronski (2018) 
that the negativity bias (in general, not specific to truth) might be a “conditional phenomenon”, 
suggesting that “the impact of valenced information is not determined in an absolute sense but 
instead depends on people’s broader sets of beliefs and expectancies” (p. 200; see also 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). This dovetails with our evidence that when information is 
framed negatively, individuals’ expectations impact whether they believe the statement to be 
true or false.  
 
General Discussion 
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In this manuscript we investigated the negativity bias in judgments of truth, which holds that 
negatively framed information (compared to content-wise identical, but positively framed 
information) is more likely to be deemed true. Four studies indicate that there might be more to 
tell about the negativity bias in judgments of truth than has been previously thought. In Study 
1, we show that when using newly developed statements that follow the same logic inherent to 
those previously used (see Hilbig, 2009, 2012a, b), no support could be garnered for the 
occurrence of a negativity bias. If anything, the data points into the direction of a positivity 
bias. Upon closer inspection of our and previous items, it occurred to us that individuals’ 
expectations may play a crucial role when judging the veracity of statistical statements. In Study 
2 we therefore assessed individuals’ expectations regarding the frequency of occurrence for all 
statements and observed an interesting pattern: When looking at statements that showed a 
negativity bias, participants had overestimated the frequency of events for the negatively 
framed statements. We think that this makes sense from a perspective guided by expectations: 
Learning that the actual percentages are lower than expected for something negative is 
ultimately good news (the world is better than expected) and therefore individuals presumably 
want to believe it to be true (Sharot et al., 2011, 2007). In turn, learning that the actual 
percentages are higher than expected for something negative is bad news (the world is worse 
than expected) and presumably individuals therefore would prefer this statement to be false.  
Based on this data-driven speculation, we systematically tested the role of expectations 
by manipulating the percentages in our statements: In Study 3 we lowered the percentages in 
the negatively framed version to create the effect of learning that the world is better than 
expected. This resulted in a negativity bias where no one was observed in Studies 1a and 1b. In 
Study 4, we took it one step further and varied the percentages for both the negatively and the 
positively framed statements, to investigate over- and underestimation effects for both frames. 
Study 4 suggests that overestimation generally appeared to increase the likelihood of truth 
ratings. Importantly, this main effect was qualified by an interaction with valence, suggesting 
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that overestimation results in higher truth ratings only when the statements were framed 
negatively. Learning that the world is worse or better than expected appears to influence truth 
judgments more when looking at the downsides and negative states, and not so much at the 
positive states of our society. 
Importantly, throughout the studies we adjusted the percentages according to sample 
mean estimations of frequency assessed in Study 2. Therefore, we assume that over- and 
underestimation was present on the group level, however, this might have not been the case for 
every single individual. As a result, effects of expectations might be even stronger when 
considering individuals’ idiosyncratic expectations. This procedure has been used in other areas 
of research, which also hinted that the direction of a deviance between observation and 
expectation plays a crucial role (and more so when the deviance feels positive compared to 
negative). For example, Sharot, Korn, and Dolan (2011) presented participants with 80 
descriptions of adverse life events and asked how likely this event was to occur to them. After 
providing an estimate, individuals were presented with the average probability and then, in a 
second session, individuals were again asked how likely it was to them that such an event could 
occur. Although the researchers found that participants remembered descriptions for which they 
over- and underestimated the likelihood equally well, they updated their beliefs in an 
asymmetric way. Participants updated their beliefs more in response to information for which 
they overestimated the occurrence (percentages were better than expected) compared to 
information for which they underestimated the occurrence (percentages were worse than 
expected). This tendency was coined “optimism bias” (Sharot et al., 2007). Using such a two-
sessions-paradigm, future research could investigate whether effects of over- versus 
underestimation might be even stronger when taking idiosyncratic expectations into account. 
The present research also allows for first assumptions regarding the processes that drive 
the effects of over- and underestimation of negatively and positively framed statements. As 
noted above, learning that the actual percentages are lower than expected for something 
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negative could be perceived as good and therefore individuals presumably want to believe it to 
be true. In turn, learning that the actual percentages are higher than expected for something 
negative is bad news, which may trigger a preference for this statement to be false. Believing 
in good news and discarding bad news might be a helpful tendency, as previous research has 
highlighted that these optimistic expectations can promote better health and well-being (Taylor 
& Brown, 1988). Similar logic could explain why, in Studies 1a and 1b, we found a positivity 
bias compared to a negativity bias. While negatively framed information might still attract more 
attention (in line with the “bad is stronger than good” phenomenon, Baumeister et al., 2001), 
individuals could still be motivated so see the world as a good place. When being confronted 
with the negatively framed version of all our statements, participants might have been 
motivated to keep an optimistic view and discard statements when they were considered bad 
news. This nicely aligns with the research on the optimism bias, where individuals update their 
beliefs when learning about potential health risks – but they do so more strongly when the new 
information paints a more desirable picture of the world they are living in. Looking back at the 
estimated percentage rates from Study 2, we find that in the original negatively framed 
statements participants only overestimated the occurrence of three out of eight, which indicates 
that most of them were still bad news. Changing this situation in Studies 3 and 4 then lead to a 
shift and also to a higher likelihood that the negative compared to the positive framing was 
deemed true. Nevertheless, further research is required to deep dive into the specific 
mechanisms and investigate this assumption, as the present studies set out to explain when a 
negativity bias is likely, but not why a positivity bias occurs. 
Future research may also aim to replicate and broaden our findings with different 
statements focusing on a broader variety of topics. All statements employed in this contribution 
focused on health and well-being. However, other work investigating framing effects in the 
health domain show inconclusive findings, sometimes suggesting no differences, for example 
for promoting vaccination (O’Keefe & Nan, 2012), an advantage for gain-frames appeals when 
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advocating dental hygiene (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2007), yet an advantage for loss-frames appeals 
when advocating breast detection behaviors (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2009). We focused on health 
and well-being in our studies, because there is high consensus about what is good (good health 
and well-being) versus bad (bald health and well-being). This divide in good/bad is far more 
debatable for many other topics, and might also vary across individuals; another aspect that 
future research could investigate by focusing more on individual differences in expectations 
and judgments.  
 Next to different topics, it could also be interesting to look at the percentage rates and 
on the numbers’ actual impact on participants’ reactions. Taking a different approach than we 
did in our manuscript, one could keep the percentage rates between negative and positive frames 
constant and in the most extreme case at 50%. Ideally, researchers would find statements for 
which such a distribution is plausible and in alignment with individuals’ expectations. Then 
framing effects could be investigated while slowly adjusting the percentage rates, so as to see 
whether there are any systematic interactions between framing and numbers presented.     
Furthermore, different types of statements could be investigated, as framing effects 
could differ depending on the type of statement. For instance, in contrast to statistical 
statements, advice appears to be evaluated as qualitatively superior when framed positively (in 
terms of gains) compared to negatively (in terms of losses; Jang & Feng, 2018). In addition, the 
intensity of language used (such as in utterances) might also play a crucial role in language 
perception and might differ for positively and negatively framed information (Liebrecht, 
Hustinx, & van Mulken, 2019). 
Last but not least, research could also investigate different aspects of negativity. In this 
research, we focus on the framing of the target concept. However, one could investigate how 
negations, whether they are implicit or explicit, affect response biases in the same or a different 
setup. Holleman, Kamoen, Krouwel, van de Pol, and de Vreese (2016), for instance, have 
shown negation matters in online voting advice applications.   
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This manuscript highlights the general importance of expectations when making 
judgments of truth. This relation is especially important when being confronted with 
communication in a world of fake news and post-truth politics. In the worst case, a false 
statement is communicated in a way that mocks credibility by systematically playing off 
individuals’ expectations. In a protective fashion, the knowledge derived from the results of the 
studies in this manuscript should be used to carefully investigate the framing of a statement. 
Have the percentages been chosen to exceed or fall below expectations? Has the framing been 
manipulated to specifically highlight the negative or positive aspects of a cause? How does 
reading such a statement make me feel? Questions like these might be asked to activate a 
mindful handling of ambivalent information: Somebody might try to make the statement feel 
good, driving a “less than expected and oh, so true” reaction in unjustified cases.  
Looking back at our initial example of political information communicated via Twitter, 
the present results suggest that framing and expectations need to work in tandem to increase 
believability. That is, framing a statement as 51% approval rate versus a 49% disapproval may 
not be enough; it is important that when the negatively framed message is presented, the 
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Table 1. Overview of Statements, Mean Perceived Veracity from Study 1 
  % of “true” 
judgments 
 
% of “true” 
judgments 
 Negative frame  Positive frame  
1 
40% of all German-speaking 
women die from 
cardiovascular diseases  
27 
60% of all German-
speaking women do not 




61% of German-speaking 
women are dissatisfied with 
their looks  
62 
39% of German-speaking 
women are satisfied with 
their looks  
67 
3 
30% of German-speaking 
women text while driving a 
car  
48 
70% of German-speaking 
women do not text while 
driving a car  
62 
4 
35% of 18-25 year old 
women in German-speaking 
regions engage in binge-
drinking  
19 
65% of 18-25 year old 
women in German-




7% of women in German-
speaking areas evaluate their 
health as “bad” or “very bad”  
57 
93% of women in 
German-speaking areas 
evaluate their health as 
“good” or “very good” 
35 
6 
5% of German-speaking 
women currently suffer from 
a Burn-Out  
62 
95% of German-speaking 
women currently do not 
suffer from a Burn-Out  
56 
7 
7% of working women in 
German-speaking areas take 
antidepressants  
51 
93% of working women 
in German-speaking 




26% of single mothers in 
German-speaking areas 
depend on social welfare 
benefits  
74 
74% of single mothers in 
German-speaking areas 
do not need social 




Negativity Bias and Judgments of Truth: Jaffé and Greifeneder 
 
 29 
Table 2. Overview of Statements, Mean Perceived Veracity, and Estimated Applicability to German-Speaking Women from Study 1a and Study 2 





















 Negative frame    Positive frame    
1 
40% of all German-speaking 
women die from 
cardiovascular diseases a 
29 23.17 - 16.83 
60% of all German-speaking 
women do not die from 
cardiovascular diseases a 
68 60.38 0.38 
2 
61% of German-speaking 
women are dissatisfied with 
their looks a 
59 54.05 - 6.95 
39% of German-speaking 
women are satisfied with their 
looks a 
65 44.98 5.98 
3 
30% of German-speaking 
women text while driving a 
car a 
49 35.54 5.54 
70% of German-speaking 
women do not text while 
driving a car a 
62 62.03 - 7.97 
4 
35% of 18-25 year old 
women in German-speaking 
regions engage in binge-
drinking a 
19 16.15 -18.85 
65% of 18-25 year old women 
in German-speaking regions 
only drink moderately a 
59 57.05 -7.95 
5 
7% of women in German-
speaking areas evaluate their 
health as “bad” or “very bad” 
b 
55 19.95 12.95 
93% of women in German-
speaking areas evaluate their 
health as “good” or “very 
good” b 
33 66.75 - 26.25 
6 
5% of German-speaking 
women currently suffer from 
a Burn-Out b 
64 19.20 14.20 
95% of German-speaking 
women currently do not suffer 
from a Burn-Out b 
54 72.90 - 22.10 
7 
7% of working women in 
German-speaking areas take 
antidepressants  
53 23.17 16.17 
93% of working women in 
German-speaking areas do not 
take antidepressants  
53 75.80 - 17.20 
8 
26% of single mothers in 
German-speaking areas 
depend on social welfare 
benefits b 
75 30.73 4.73 
74% of single mothers in 
German-speaking areas do not 
need social welfare benefits b 
43 46.62 - 27.38 
a occurrence of a positivity bias; b occurrence of a negativity bias
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Table 3. Overview of Statements, Expectation Ratings from Study 2 and Adjustments for Study 4 
  Estimated 
% rate  
[Study 2] 
Adj. % rates 
below 
expectations 





% rate  
[Study 2] 
Adj. % rates 
below 
expectations 
Adj. % rates 
above 
expectations 
 Negative frame M (SD)   Positive frame M (SD)   
1 
XX% of all German-





XX% of all German-speaking 






XX% of German-speaking 





XX% of German-speaking 






XX% of German-speaking 





XX% of German-speaking 
women do not text while 





XX% of 18-25 year old 
women in German-speaking 





XX% of 18-25 year old women 
in German-speaking regions 





XX% of women in German-
speaking areas evaluate their 




XX% of women in German-
speaking areas evaluate their 






XX% of German-speaking 





XX% of German-speaking 
women currently do not suffer 





XX% of working women in 





XX% of working women in 






XX% of single mothers in 
German-speaking areas 





XX% of single mothers in 
German-speaking areas do not 










Table 4. Overview of Statements, Mean Perceived Veracity from Study 1b 
  % of “true” 
judgments 
 
% of “true” 
judgments 
 Negative frame  Positive frame  
1 
40% of all German-
speaking women die from 
cardiovascular diseases  
18 
60% of all German-
speaking women do not 




61% of German-speaking 
women are dissatisfied with 
their looks  
82 
39% of German-
speaking women are 
satisfied with their looks  
80 
3 
30% of German-speaking 




speaking women do not 
text while driving a car  
60 
4 
35% of 18-25 year old 
women in German-
speaking regions engage in 
binge-drinking  
18 
65% of 18-25 year old 
women in German-




7% of women in German-
speaking areas evaluate 
their health as “bad” or 
“very bad”  
73 
93% of women in 
German-speaking areas 
evaluate their health as 
“good” or “very good” 
50 
6 
5% of German-speaking 
women currently suffer 




currently do not suffer 
from a Burn-Out  
70 
7 
7% of working women in 
German-speaking areas 
take antidepressants  
36 
93% of working women 
in German-speaking 




26% of single mothers in 
German-speaking areas 
depend on social welfare 
benefits  
64 
74% of single mothers in 
German-speaking areas 
do not need social 
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